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Abstract This paper studies how liability dollarization conditions the effect
of exchange rate flexibility on growth. It develops a model with credit-
constrained firms facing liquidity shocks denominated in tradables while their
revenues are both in tradable and nontradables. With frictions in the reallo-
cation between tradables and nontradables, a peg is more growth-enhancing
than a float in countries with dollarized debt because it stabilizes firms’
cash flows and therefore allows them to face liquidity shock and complete
their innovation process. However, this relative advantage diminishes when
dollarization decreases. These theoretical predictions are confirmed by an
empirical analysis on a panel of 76 countries spanning 1995–2004: the higher
the degree of dollarization, the more negative the impact of exchange rate
flexibility on growth. The empirical results are robust to various specifications
and to the treatment of endogeneity.
Keywords Exchange rate regimes · Growth · Liability dollarization
JEL Classification O16 · O24 · O41 · O42
1 Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime and its impact on economic performance
is among the most controversial issues in macroeconomic policy. The empirical
works on the growth effect of exchange rate volatility conclude either on
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exchange rate neutrality, or on a different effect in industrial and developing
countries.1 Some recent studies suggest that the failure of the empirical litera-
ture at bringing a stable, clear-cut effect of exchange volatility to the fore may
be due to nonlinear effects: Razin and Rubinstein (2006) allow the exchange
rate regime to have both a direct effect on short-term growth, and an indirect
one that is channeled through the crisis probability, while Aghion et al. (2009)
argue that the choice of exchange rate regime should depend on financial
development. Using a sample of 83 countries spanning the years 1960–2000,
they show that real exchange rate volatility can have a significant impact on
the long-term rate of productivity growth, but the effect depends critically on
the countries’ level of financial development.
This paper focuses on liability dollarization, which is a feature of financial
underdevelopment that is particularly prominent in emerging markets, and
shows that it can explain the contrasting effects of exchange rate flexibility
on growth in developing and industrial countries. Liability dollarization, that
is, the limited ability of developing countries to borrow in their own currency,
is also referred to as “original sin”. The focus on dollarization is justified by
the idea that, on the one hand, the volatility of cash flows matters for long-
run growth, as empirical works tend to show (Aghion et al. 2005, 2007); on the
other, liability dollarization impairs firms’ capacities to hedge currency risk.
This idea is tackled both theoretically and empirically.
On the theoretical side, I borrow from Aghion et al. (2009) to build a
stylized model in which volatility matters for long-run growth: when firms
face credit constraints, negative shocks to their cash flows deteriorate their
innovating capacities, whereas a positive shock will not have any impact if
the firm is already at its optimum. This asymmetric effect of shocks under
financial frictions rationalizes the negative impact of cash-flow volatility on
innovation and growth: the consequences of negative cash flow shocks are
not offset by the effects of positive shocks. Besides, wages are sticky, which
makes exchange rate policy matter for cash flow volatility. I supplement this
framework with two important features to account for the role of financial
dollarization under different exchange rate regimes: (1) the production is
split into tradable and nontradable goods while firms face costs in tradable
goods when innovating; and (2) the firms’ debt can be partially or completely
denominated in terms of tradable goods. The question then is: depending on
the level of dollarization, what regime stabilizes better the cash flows -that is,
profits net of debt repayments- in terms of tradable goods, thus allowing a
better average financing capacity?
1Baxter and Stockman (1989) were the first to bring this “instability puzzle” forward. The
literature has since been inconclusive on the subject: Husain et al. (2005) find that exchange
rate flexibility is growth-enhancing in industrial countries and neutral in developing economies,
while Dubas et al. (2005), relying on an alternative exchange-rate classification, find that a fixed
exchange rate has good growth performances in the latter while it is neutral in the former. Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) find that, on average, countries with a fixed exchange rate regime
grow at a slower rate. See Tavlas et al. (2008) for a recent survey on this literature.
Exchange Rate Volatility and Productivity Growth: The Role of... 503
The relative stabilizing properties of exchange rate regimes is a recurring
question in the theoretical literature. In particular, whether liability dollar-
ization reverses the superiority of the flexible regime in the presence of
foreign shocks has been a particularly compelling issue.2,3 Cespedes et al.
(2002) and Devereux et al. (2006) argue that, when using a full-fledged DSGE
model, the conventional ranking is unchanged. However, Cook and Cook
(2002) and Cook (2004) find, with different specifications, that the picture
is more nuanced. Here, I develop a stylized model with one feature that
is essential in evaluating the different performance of regimes, namely the
frictions in adjusting consumption between tradable and nontradable goods,
which makes the nontradable sector particularly vulnerable. These frictions
have been emphasized by Christiano et al. (2004) and Mendoza (2001), but
in other contexts than the choice of exchange rate regimes (namely, currency
crises and sudden stops). Indeed, with low elasticity of substitution between
tradable and nontradable goods, the output measured in foreign currency is
more volatile under flexible regimes. As a result, floating exchange rates are
detrimental for growth as compared to fixed exchange rates, especially in
highly dollarized countries. In low-dollarization countries, this ranking can be
reversed thanks to the hedging properties of domestically-denominated debt.
We illustrate these effects in the model when the economy is hit by shocks on
the tradable technology.
To test the basic hypothesis that exchange rate flexibility has a more
negative impact in dollarized countries, standard growth regressions are used.
Those standard growth regressions are augmented by a measure of exchange
rate flexibility, a measure of external dollarization and the interaction term
of exchange rate flexibility and dollarization. The results are based on a
dynamic panel of 76 emerging and industrial countries between 1995 and
2004 described above. To measure exchange rate flexibility, I use the Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) classification of exchange rate regimes. The
dollarization measure is the external “original sin” taken from Hausmann et al.
(2001) and Hausmann and Panizza (2003). The empirical results show that
exchange rate flexibility is more detrimental to growth in dollarized countries
than in non-dollarized countries, which is in line with the model’s predictions.
These findings are robust to various specifications and to the treatment of
endogeneity.
Among the empirical works on liability dollarization at the macro level,
only a few have examined the overall growth impact of original sin.4 Bleaney
and Vargas (2009) is closer to our approach. They investigate the role of the
2Early contributions include, among others, Calvo (2000); Krugman (2000); Aghion et al. (2000).
3Note that even in the Mundell-Fleming model, the type of shocks and capital controls can also
reverse this oft-quoted result. See Ball (2010).
4See for example on liability dollarization Arteta (2005), Calvo et al. (2004), De Nicolo et al.
(2003), Reinhart et al. (2003), Levy-Yeyati (2006), Eichengreen et al. (2005), Bleaney and Vargas
(2009) and in particular, on its impact on growth Reinhart et al. (2003), Levy-Yeyati (2006) and
Bleaney and Vargas (2009).
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debt composition to explain the negative effect of depreciation on growth in
emerging markets. Our approach differs in that it focuses on the interaction of
debt composition with exchange rate volatility -and more generally, exchange
rate management, and not exchange rate depreciations.
Section 2 presents a stylized model of growth and monetary policy. Section
3 derives the empirical implications of the model regarding the link between
growth and exchange rate volatility. Section 4 tests these empirical predictions.
2 A Stylized Monetary Model with Growth
In this section, we present a stylized model to illustrate the impact of exchange
rate management on growth in the presence of liability dollarization. The
model combines three important features: (i) growth proceeds from innovation
undertaken by firms with sufficient funds to meet liquidity shocks; (ii) wages
are sticky, implying that the transmission of macroeconomic shocks is shaped
by the choice of exchange rate regime; and (iii) firms’ debt can be partially or
completely denominated in dollars.
First, we describe how, in the presence of credit constraints, growth depends
on firms’ profits and thus on the interplay between liability dollarization and
the real exchange rate, but only in a partial equilibrium approach. Second, the
model is closed by introducing monetary policy and households.
2.1 Firms and the Growth Process
Consider a small open economy with a continuum of firms, indexed by i ∈
[0, 1]. Firms produce both tradable goods T, which are identical to the outside
world good, and nontradable ones N. There are two currencies: the domestic
currency (peso) and the foreign one (dollar).
Firms are price-taker and competitive so that the law of one price applies in
the sector of tradables:
PTt = St PT∗t
where PTt and P
T∗
t are respectively the domestic (peso) and foreign (dollar)
price of tradable goods and St is the nominal exchange rate. PT∗t is assumed to
be constant and normalized to one. Thus PTt = St.
The timing within period t can be summarized as follows. First, wages are
preset. The entrepreneurs borrow to be able to innovate in period t + 1: that is
upgrade At, the level of productivity. An aggregate productivity shock occurs
in the tradable sector, firms hire labor and produce tradable and nontradable
goods. Firms repay their debt and pay the wages. Firms face idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks in dollars. If the liquidity shocks are financed, then firms are
able to innovate. If they are not financed, then firms cannot innovate and
disappear at the end of the period. Finally, firms distribute profits.
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First, the process governing the evolution of productivity is presented to
determine how growth depends on current cash flows. We then determine cash
flows.
2.1.1 The Evolution of Productivity
Innovation Process The innovation process is specified as follows: if the firm
is able to overcome the liquidity shock of period t, then its t + 1 productivity
is upgraded by a factor δ > 1. Otherwise, the firm keeps the same productivity
level. As a result, aggregate productivity evolves according to:
At+1 = δρt At + (1 − ρt)At
with ρt the proportion of innovating firms. The aggregate growth rate is
therefore gt = (δ − 1)ρt.
Credit Market Imperfections and Liquidity Shocks To be able to innovate, the
firm has to pay a fixed cost Dt = dAt (d > 0) at the beginning of period t. Firms
start the period without funds, so they must borrow Dt. It is assumed that the
cost of borrowing is lower than the expected value of innovation, which implies
that firms always choose to pay the fixed cost. This cost can be viewed as
spending on R&D, equipment goods or investment in a new technology. Since
these goods are tradables, we assume that this cost is denominated in dollars.
At the end of period t, a liquidity shock Atit, where 
i
t is independently and
identically distributed across firms, threatens the completion of the innovation
process of firm i. If the firm does not finance this cost, it cannot innovate. If it
meets this cost, it recovers Atit at the end of the current period. At
i
t can be
viewed as a transitory shock that would ruin the business unless there is enough
liquidity to overcome it. For simplicity, it is also assumed that the liquidity cost
can be financed with a zero interest rate. As a consequence, the innovation
cost is neutral regarding the net profit of the current period. Therefore, it is
always profitable for the firms to finance the liquidity shock.
We assume that the liquidity shock is denominated in dollars. This as-
sumption is important since the entrepreneurs’ ability to hedge this shock will
determine the innovation rate of the economy. It is justified by the fact that it is
of the same nature as the initial fixed cost, which is in dollars too. For example,
if Dt stands for the expenses on an equipment good, Atit can represent a
missing part that has to be purchased again.
The access to financial markets is therefore critical to determine the innova-
tion capacity of the firm at this point, as Aghion et al. (2009) show. However,
here, in order to stress the specific role of liability dollarization, we assume
that the firm has no access at all to credit markets at this stage, so firms are
able to overcome the transitory liquidity shock if and only if their cash flow is
sufficient to meet the cost:
t ≥ it
where t is the cash flow of the firm expressed in dollars and scaled by At.
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Firms have the same cash flows t and differ only regarding the liquidity
shock it. Therefore, ρt, the proportion of firms which are not constrained (and
thus of innovating firms), is the proportion of firms whose liquidity shock is
lower than t:
ρt = P(it < t) = F(t) (1)
where F is the cumulative distribution of it.
The aggregate growth rate depends directly on the level of cash flows t.
Volatility and Growth Here, I give an example of how volatility affects aver-
age growth, that is E(ρt). Assume that the idiosyncratic liquidity shock φit is
uniformly distributed over (φ, φ), and that the disturbance on profits t result-
ing from the aggregate shock and exchange rate policy is of the following form:
t =
{
E() + σπ with probability 12
E() − σπ with probability 12
(2)
with σπ strictly positive. σπ is a measure of aggregate volatility around the
steady-state profits E().
I assume that E() − σπ > φ, which means that in the worst state of nature,
there is always a positive fraction of firms that are able to overcome the
liquidity shock. Under this reasonable assumption, the probability to innovate
given the aggregate shock is then:
ρt = min
{
t − φ
φ − φ , 1
}
The growth rate ρ is concave in . An increase in the size of the aggregate
shock σπ , which corresponds to a mean-preserving spread, would then de-
crease the proportion of innovating firms E(ρ) -and therefore the average
growth rate. The intuition is that when shocks are large, all firms innovate in
the good state. In that case, more volatility would crowd out more firms in the
bad state while not allowing more firms to innovate in the good state. The idea
is simply that when volatility increases, the gains generated in the good states
are exhausted sooner or later, which does not allow to make for the additional
losses in bad states.
2.1.2 Firms’ Cash-Flows
Production and Growth Firms have identical technologies. A firm produces
both tradable and nontradable goods. The tradable and nontradable produc-
tions of firm i ∈ [0, 1] during period t are respectively denoted by AtYTit and
AtY Nit and:
YTit = YTt = eut (3)
Y Nit = Y Nt =
√
Lt (4)
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where Lt denotes labor. YTit and Y
Ni
t are the firm’s productions scaled by the
level of productivity and ut is the aggregate productivity shock in the tradable
sector, with ut = σ , σ > 0 with probability 1/2 and ut = −σ with probability
1/2. For simplicity, it is assumed that the production of nontradables requires
labor while the production of tradables involves no input. This specification
has been chosen to capture the fact that the nontradable sector is more labor-
intensive than the tradable sector.
Firms choose employment to maximize the nontradable profit PNt
√
Lt −
Wt Lt with respect to Lt, where Wt is the wage scaled by At, and PNt is the peso
price of nontradable goods. We get the implicit labor demand function:
Wt Lt = P
N
t Y
N
t
2
(5)
The firm’s gross profits are then equal to YTt + PNt Y Nt /2PTt .
Indebtment and Dollarization It is assumed that debt Dt = dAt is contracted
in nominal terms and is denominated either in foreign currency (dollars) or
in local currency (pesos). An exogenous fraction α is denominated in dollars
while the rest is denominated in pesos. α is the degree of dollarization.
We assume that the level of dollarization is exogenous. Indeed, the fact
that liability dollarization is imposed on developing countries is commonly
admitted in the literature.5,6 This financial markets incompleteness is often
related to the lack of sound institutions and can therefore be regarded as
exogenous.7
r∗, the interest rate on dollar bonds, is fixed internationally. It is assumed
that foreigners are risk neutral and value dollars so that r, the interest rate on
peso bonds, satisfies the following no-arbitrage condition:
E
(
1 + r
PTt
)
= 1 + r∗
At the end of period t, the firm has therefore to repay in dollars:(
α + 1
PTt Et−1 1PTt
(1 − α)
)
(1 + r∗)Dt
5See for example Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
6Yet, some authors find that exchange rate regimes do affect firms’ balance sheets. In particular,
the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime leads to a higher degree of currency matching
(and the opposite for the adoption of fixed regimes), as Galiani et al. (2003) show for the case of
Argentina’s currency board and Kamil (2009) does for a panel of emerging countries. However,
these studies are conducted on developing countries only. On our macro data set, for a given
exchange rate regime, developing countries still exhibit higher liability dollarization than industrial
ones, which is a symptom of imposed original sin.
7Existing explanations point at time inconsistency problems related to the temptation to “default”
on local currency debt through inflation (Calvo and Guidotti 1989), the incidence of implicit debtor
guarantees (Burnside et al. 2001) and signaling problems (De la Torre et al. 2003), among others.
De Nicolo et al. (2003) provides evidence that the credibility of macroeconomic policy and the
quality of institutions are both key determinants of cross-country variations in dollarization.
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Cash Flows The liquidity shock occurs after the firm has paid the wage bill
and repaid the debt, so the cash flow in terms of dollars and scaled by At is the
following:
t = YTt +
1
2
PNt
PTt
Y Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross profits
−
⎛
⎝α + 1
PTt Et−1
(
1
PTt
) (1 − α)
⎞
⎠ (1 + r∗)d
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt repayments
(6)
The cash flows include gross profits, but to get the actual cash on hand,
debt repayments must be subtracted from them. Comparing the gross profit
component and the debt component of cash flows gives the actual financing
capacity of firms.
Because firms’ revenues are partly in nontradable goods while the liquidity
shock is denominated in tradables, firms face a currency mismatch. According
to Eq. 6, firms’ gross profits are sensitive to nominal exchange rate variations
(changes in PTt ). However, the peso-denominated fraction of firms’ debt
helps them hedge the variations in the nontradable value of their profits. For
example, everything else equal, a nominal depreciation implies a fall in the
value of gross profits in terms of tradables. If α < 1, a nominal depreciation
leads to a decrease in debt repayments in terms of tradables, which alleviates
the overall impact of the depreciation on the total cash flows, whereas if α = 1,
this hedging property of debt is absent.
However, whether this intuition is robust to general equilibrium is not
guaranteed. The following subsection closes the model in order to derive its
properties in general equilibrium.
2.2 Closing the Model and Introducing Exchange Rate Policy
The purpose of this subsection is to examine the impact of exchange rate policy
in terms of transmission of shocks to prices and quantities, and therefore to
firms’ cash flows.
The presence of nominal rigidities (preset wages) implies that monetary
policy has real consequences, in particular in terms of cash flow volatility.
Some other key assumptions contribute to shape the model’s predictions. First,
the nontradable sector is more labor-intensive than the tradable one. This is
empirically relevant, but it has also an important implication, which is that
an output contraction is consistent with a real depreciation. As a result, the
peso-denominated debt has hedging properties regarding cash-flows volatility
in terms of dollars. Second, the elasticity of substitution between tradables and
nontradables is lower than one, which is widely admitted in the literature, but
is also key in ranking the flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes in terms of
cash-flow volatility.
The model is closed in a simplistic way in order to keep the model as
tractable as possible. The following assumptions are made, without loss of
generality: (i) the demand addressed to firms is given by consumers without
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access to financial markets (hand-to-mouth consumers); (ii) the government
controls directly the general price level. Finally, (iii) we assume, as in Aghion
et al. (2009), that the real wage at the beginning of period t is assumed equal
to some reservation value, kAtt:
Wt
E(Pt)
= kAt (7)
Households Denote by CTt and C
N
t the consumptions of tradables and non-
tradables by households, scaled by At. Since nontradables cannot be traded
internationally, the nontradable output is entirely consumed in equilibrium:
Y Nt = CNt (8)
Besides, since households do not have access to financial markets, the tradable
consumption is what remains from the tradable production after repaying the
debt:
YTt −
⎛
⎝α + (1 − α) 1
PTt E
(
1
PTt
)
⎞
⎠ (1 + r∗)d = CTt (9)
This means that both current accounts, in tradables and nontradables, are
balanced.8
The relative demand for tradables and nontradables by households is
standard. It follows:
PNt
PTt
=
(
1 − γ
γ
CTt
CNt
) 1
θ
(10)
This results from the maximization by households of a CES consumption
basket, given their resources. θ is the elasticity of substitution between tradable
and nontradable goods. It is assumed that θ < 1, which means that goods are
weakly substitutable. This is a standard assumption regarding tradables and
nontradables. 0 < γ < 1 is the weight of tradables in the consumption basket.
The associated general price index is the following:
Pt =
(
γ PT1−θt + (1 − γ )PN1−θt
) 1
1−θ (11)
8The current account in the tradable sector is balanced because we have assumed that there is
no intertemporal trading, that is no asset trade. This assumption simplifies the analysis but is
not crucial. Qualitatively, the results would be unchanged if we introduced intertemporal trade
in bonds. This is because, as long as there is imperfect risk sharing, a productivity shock leads
households to alter their consumption, which is at the origin of the mechanisms of the model.
Trade in bonds only limits the impact of productivity shocks on consumption by sharing their effect
between current and future consumption; it does not suppress it. The difference with the model
without trade in bonds is only quantitative and does not alter the comparison between regimes.
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Monetary Policy Monetary policy targets either the stability of the general
price index - flexible exchange rate:
Pt = P¯ (12)
or the stability of the nominal exchange rate - fixed exchange rate:
PTt = P¯T (13)
where P¯ and P¯T are constant.
This model is solved with either one of the two monetary policies (12) or
(13).
3 Model’s Empirical Implications
In this section, I study the differential impact of aggregate shocks on the
quantities and prices under both regimes by using the log-linearized version
of the model and then derive some conclusions on exchange rate regimes and
growth.9
In what follows, xt denotes the deviation from the non-stochastic steady
state of Xt: xt = Xt−XX  ln(Xt) − ln(X). Time subscript are dropped for
simplicity.
3.1 Reactions of Quantities and Prices to Shocks
After log-linearizing the model, the following proposition can be derived:
Proposition 1 After an identical negative (positive) productivity shock in the
tradable sector:
(i) If α = 1, the production of nontradables (yN) falls (rises) more under
a peg than under a f loat. However, the relative price of nontradables
(pN − pT) (henceforth the real exchange rate) experiences a higher de-
preciation (appreciation) under a f loat.
(ii) If α = 1, the fall (rise) in the nontradable production valued in terms of
tradables (yN + pN − pT) is larger under a f loat than under a peg.
(iii) Under a f loat, this fall (rise) is mitigated when α diminishes.
(i) is a standard result. A negative shock on the productivity of the tradable
sector requires a real depreciation (a fall in pN − pT) which results in a
contractionary deflation in the nontradable sector under both regimes, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. Indeed, in both regimes, a deflation in pN generates a
9The log-linearized version of the model as well as the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are available in
the technical appendix at: https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=explorer&chrome=true&srcid=
0Bwb2sZ9M2da4YTcwNTE3MTMtMDM3OC00Y2RmLWI4MTEtNzMzNDc0ZWZmOTUw &
hl=en.
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Fig. 1 The effect of a negative shock in the tradable sector (u = −1)
contraction in yN because the nontradable sector uses labor and the wages
are predetermined. This negative effect on yN is accentuated under the fixed
exchange rate regime because the real depreciation occurs entirely through a
deflation in pN while under a flexible regime it is shared between a rise in
pT and a fall in pN . However, precisely because of the further contraction
in yN , the real exchange rate depreciation is milder under a peg because it
compensates for the fall in yT .
As a result, the comparative impact of a negative or positive shock on the
nontradable production valued in terms of tradables is ambiguous. But, when
θ < 1, the price effects dominate. Take the case of a negative shock on the
tradable production. When α = 1, the additional fall in the relative price of
nontradables under a float offsets the additional fall in nontradable output
under a peg. The production of nontradables expressed in tradables therefore
falls more under a float than under a peg. Noticeably, the traditional contrac-
tionary deflation is present under the fixed exchange rate regime. Despite
that, the output in terms of tradables is more affected if the exchange rate
freely floats. The existence of frictions in the reallocation between tradable
and nontradable goods inside the consumption basket is crucial to generate
this result.
When α = 1, all the debt is denominated in dollar, so it plays no role in
stabilizing the dollar value of cash flows, whatever the exchange rate regime,
hence (ii). But when α falls, the consumption of tradables is stabilized under
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a float thanks to the hedging effect of the peso-denominated debt, which
mitigates the required real depreciation and the consecutive adjustment in yN ,
as Fig. 1 shows. This gives (iii).
3.2 The Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Growth
If we admit, following the arguments of Section 2.1.1, that lower cash-flow
volatility yields higher growth through a higher innovating probability, it is
possible to infer what regime is preferred in terms of growth.
Proposition 2
(i) If α = 1, a peg yields higher growth than a f loat.
(ii) When α decreases, the growth dif ferential between a peg and a f loat
decreases.
(iii) If the indebtment level and the elasticity of substitution are high and if the
share of nontradable production is low, there exist values of α > 0 such
that a f loat yields higher growth than a peg.
(i) is derived directly from Proposition 1. Under complete liability dollariza-
tion, a flexible exchange rate regime is characterized by accentuated variations
of cash flows expressed in tradables, and therefore by lower average growth.
(ii) comes from the fact that the peso-denominated debt has two stabilizing
effects on firms’ cash flows under a float: (1) a direct stabilizing effect through
the hedging role of debt repayments in pesos, and (2) an indirect stabilizing
effect through the stabilization of the nontradable output expressed in terms
of tradables (Proposition 1). Thus, under a flexible exchange rate regime, the
level of dollarization has a negative impact on growth because it annihilate the
hedging properties of the peso-denominated debt. Put differently, the hedging
properties of the peso-denominated debt can be exploited to stabilize cash
flows only within flexible exchange rate regimes.
(iii) states that under certain conditions, when the level of liability dol-
larization diminishes, the floating regime can even dominate the peg. These
condition are those that increase the hedging properties of debt: a high indebt-
ment level, a low share of nontradable production. Besides, a high elasticity
of substitution θ diminishes the relative advantage of the fixed exchange rate
regime in stabilizing gross profits.
Figure 2 shows the behavior of the variance of firms’ cash flows under fixed
and flexible exchange rate regimes for some parameter values. The dashed
lines are constructed under the assumption that the steady-state ratio of debt
repayments over the tradable consumption is equal to 0.1 (low level of debt)
and the solid lines are drawn under the assumption that it is equal to 0.7
(high level of debt). Besides, the elasticity of substitution θ has been set at 0.6,
which is a standard estimate of the elasticity of substitution between tradable
and nontradable goods (Lorenzo et al. 2005), and the weight of nontradable
goods in the consumption basket 1 − γ as well as in cash flows κ are set
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Fig. 2 The variance of firms’ cash flows
to 0.6 (Mendoza 2001).10 It appears clearly that the volatility of cash flows
under a float increases with the level of dollarization under both parameters’
configuration. Under the first hypothesis (low debt), the volatility of cash
flows with the flexible exchange rate regime is always higher than with the
fixed regime, whereas under the second hypothesis (high debt), the volatility
becomes lower with the flexible exchange rate regime for small values of α.
As a conclusion, the testable empirical implication of this model is that the
fixed exchange rate regime is growth-enhancing as compared to the flexible
exchange rate regime in countries with high liability dollarization and that the
growth differential is decreasing as the level of dollarization falls. Whether
there are values of dollarization for which a float becomes more growth-
enhancing than a peg depends on parameters values and has to be determined
empirically.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, the prediction that the level of dollarization conditions the
impact of exchange rate regimes on growth is tested. The basic hypothesis
is that exchange rate flexibility has a more negative impact in dollarized
countries.
To do so, standard growth regressions are used. These regressions are
augmented by a measure of exchange rate flexibility, a measure of external
dollarization and the interaction term of exchange rate flexibility and dollariza-
tion. First, the data and methodology are presented and then the results based
on a dynamic panel of 76 countries between 1995 and 2004 are discussed.
10See the technical appendix for the definition of κ .
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4.1 Data and Methodology
As is common in the growth empirical literature, we work on non-
overlapping five-year averages. This transformation aims at filtering business-
cycle fluctuations and so allows us to focus on long-run effects only.
4.1.1 The Dependent Variable
The explained variable is the average growth rate of productivity on a five-
year period. Productivity is defined as the ratio of real output per worker. Real
GDP is in 1995 PPP-adjusted US dollars. The work force and GDP data come
respectively from the World Bank (World Development Indicators database)
and CEPII (CHELEM database).
4.1.2 Exchange Rate Flexibility Variable
The measure of exchange rate flexibility is an index of exchange rate
flexibility based on the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) (henceforth LS)
classification of exchange rate regimes. They define exchange rate regimes
according to the behavior of three classification variables: changes in the
nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these changes, and the volatility of
international reserves. Since originally this index is a measure of rigidity,
exchange rate regimes are reordered from the more rigid to the more flexible:
{1, 2, 3, 4} = {fix, crawling peg, dirty float, float}. This index is averaged over
five years.
4.1.3 Channels of Exchange Rate Flexibility
First, according to the model, the negative effects of exchange rate flexibility
in dollarized countries is originated in the variations of the real exchange
rate. We therefore use a measure of the volatility of the real exchange rate
in order to test this prediction. We compute this volatility as the standard
deviation of annual changes in the logarithm of the World Bank index of
real effective exchange rate (REER). In line with the model, this variable is
positively correlated with the LS flexibility measure (see Appendix B).
Second, in the model, we assumed the law of one price. The variations
in the REER are therefore driven exclusively by the price of nontradable
goods relative to tradables. However, violations of the law of one price and
more generally variation in the terms-of-trade also affect the volatility of
the REER in the data. We therefore introduce the standard deviation of
annual changes in the terms-of-trade index provided by the World Bank in
order to control whether the impact of exchange rate flexibility comes from
terms-of-trade volatility or from the relative price of tradables. Besides, this
variable could be an important determinant of growth, as shown by Mendoza
(1997).
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4.1.4 The Dollarization Variable
The most important and most problematic variable is the liability dollarization
measure. It is difficult to find a measure which is both accurate and encompass-
ing. Hausmann et al. (2001) and Hausmann and Panizza (2003) provide data
that can be used to construct a proxy for liability dollarization for a sample
of industrial and developing countries. They provide measures of “original
sin”, that is the inability of an economy to borrow internationally in its own
currency. Their dataset covers 90 industrial and developing countries. They
rely on BIS data of the currency breakdown of foreign banks’ assets and
liabilities and construct three indicators of original sin.
Those measures are restricted de facto to external dollarization and have a
small time coverage, but they encompass industrial countries and thus allow a
substantial variability in the dollarization index. Their advantage is that they
give a good picture of the currency composition of the world’s banking sector’s
assets in the economy—especially for debt securities—and of the ability of
countries to hedge currency risk through swaps. The original sin measures are
provided as averages for 1993–1998 and 1999–2001, which allows to use only
two 5-year sequences, 1995–1999 and 2000–2004. The dollarization index used
in this paper is computed as the average of the three indicators. This index,
called OSIN, ranges from 0 to 1.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of original sin in industrial and developing
countries. It appears that it is concentrated on its maximum value in developing
countries, while in industrial countries it is lower on average and shows more
variability. Indeed, 90% of developing countries have an original sin value
between 0.9 and 1, whereas only 20% of industrial countries are in that
case. Besides, it is noteworthy that the original sin index varies only in 20%
of the countries between 1993–1998 and 1999–2001. Those characteristics of
the dollarization variable, that is high persistence and concentration on high
values in developing countries, have to be born in mind when choosing the
methodology and running the robustness checks.
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Fig. 3 Distribution of original sin in industrial and developing countries (pooled sample)
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4.1.5 Other Control Variables
The set of control variables follows Levine et al. (2000) and Aghion et al.
(2009): financial development measured as in Beck et al. (1999) by the amount
of credit provided by banks and other financial institutions to the private sector
(as a share of GDP), education measured as the average years of secondary
schooling (Barro and Lee 2000), inflation and the size of government measured
by governement consumption as a percentage of GDP and trade openness
measured by the share of exports and imports in GDP (World Bank).
Finally, the usable dataset covers 76 countries and two periods: 1995–1999
and 2000–2004. Appendix A gives the exhaustive list of countries present in
both samples and Appendix B provides some descriptive statistics.
4.1.6 Methodology
The benchmark specification follows Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995), and more
specifically Aghion et al. (2009). But, instead of interacting exchange rate
flexibility and financial development as Aghion et al. (2009) do, I interact
exchange rate flexibility and dollarization. The estimated equation is the
following:
yit = yit − yit−1 = (α − 1)yit−1 + γ1 Flexit + γ2 OSINit
+γ3 Flexit ∗ OSINit + dt + it (14)
where yit is the logarithm of real output per worker in country i at the end
of period t, t = 1995–1999, 2000–2004, Flexit is the exchange rate flexibility
measure, OSINit is the measure of original sin, dt is a time effect and 
i
t is the
error term.
γ1 + γ3 OSINit describes the overall effect of exchange rate flexibility on
growth. γ1 (the linear term) and γ1 + γ3 (which is provided as complementary
information) can be interpreted respectively as the effect of exchange rate
flexibility in low dollarization countries (original sin = 0) and in high dollariza-
tion countries (original sin = 1). The threshold original sin for which the sign of
the overall impact of exchange rate flexibility changes is −γ1
γ3
. The estimate for
−γ1
γ3
is provided along with its significance test as complementary information
in the regressions. Besides, a Wald test for the significance of exchange rate
total effect is run.
The main hypothesis to test is whether exchange rate flexibility has a more
negative effect on growth when the level of dollarization increases. This would
be validated by the data if γ3 is found significantly negative. Otherwise, the
model would be rejected. The second hypothesis is that the threshold original
sin −γ1
γ3
is between 0 and 1. This would mean that the impact of exchange rate
risk on growth switches from positive to negative within the actual range of the
original sin measure. The validation of this hypothesis would shed some light
on the exchange rate instability puzzle, which could then be explained by the
presence of this kind of non-linearities.
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Since the model is dynamic, country effects are necessarily correlated with
yit−1. The GMM dynamic panel data estimator developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) is implemented. The persistence
of the dollarization data justifies the use of the extended system-GMM estima-
tor elaborated by Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000). Robust two-step standard
errors are also computed by following the method of Windmeijer (2004).
Using this approach, the issue of the endogeneity of the lagged explained
variable is addressed. The set of instruments is selected according to the
following assumption: all the explanatory variables except initial income are
predetermined and they are uncorrelated with fixed effects.11 This assump-
tion has been chosen after excluding more restrictive ones which suffered
from weak instruments issues according to the Anderson and Cragg-Donald
tests of underidentification.12 These tests assess whether the instruments give
sufficient information to identify the effect of the variables of interest. The
tables report the Hansen test in order to check whether the set of instruments
is globally valid.
4.2 The Role of Financial Dollarization
Table 1 shows the results of the GMM regression of productivity growth on
the set of explanatory variables described earlier, using Eq. 14.
Consider the impact of exchange rate flexibility and original sin on growth.
Regression (1) of Table 1 shows that in our sample, the overall impact of
exchange rate flexibility on growth is negative. But, importantly, as column (2)
shows, liability dollarization makes the impact of real exchange rate volatility
on growth more negative, as conjectured. This is illustrated by the fact that the
coefficient of the interaction term of original sin and exchange rate flexibility
is significantly negative (at the 5% level).
As conjectured, the threshold level of liability dollarization above which
exchange rate flexibility becomes detrimental to growth is between 0 and
1 (0.56). As a consequence, on the one hand, the impact of exchange rate
flexibility is significantly negative in both specifications when original sin is
equal to 1. On the other hand, exchange rate flexibility has a positive impact
on growth in low dollarization countries (the coefficient of the linear term is
11In practice, Eq. 14 is differentiated and the second lag of the endogenous variable yit−2 is used
as an instrument for yit−1, as well as further lags. Though our sample has only two available
observations because of the scarcity of dollarization data, we can rely on lags of yit beyond the
limits of our data. To limit the number of instruments, I use only yit−2 and y
i
t−3 to instrument
yit−1. Since we assume that the other regressors are predetermined, we use their first and second
lags as instruments. The system-GMM method consists in adding Eq. 14 in level as additional
observations to limit the problem of weak instruments in presence of persistence. yit−1 is then
instrumented with yit−1 and the other regressors in levels.
12This assumption has also been chosen for practical reasons. Because of data scarcity, it is
impossible to use second order lags of original sin. It can be therefore considered at best as
predetermined (the other variables, in particular the lagged explained variable, can still be
instrumented thanks to the available higher lags).
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Table 1 Growth effect of the flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime and its channels—2-step
system-GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial output per worker −0.006 0.005 −0.002 0.000435 0.00327
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.00733) (0.00556)
Financial development 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.00466 0.00246
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.00740) (0.00888)
Original sin 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.0364* 0.0511***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.0207) (0.0181)
LS flexibility index −0.006*** 0.009** 0.005* 0.00793**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.00368)
LS flexibility × original sin −0.016** −0.008 −0.0139**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.00674)
Real effective exchange 0.234 0.400*
rate volatility (0.181) (0.215)
REER volatility × original sin −0.516** −0.617**
(0.206) (0.259)
Terms of trade volatility −0.516
(0.553)
TT volatility × original sin 0.465
(0.569)
LS flexibility × financial 0.000704
development (0.00272)
Effect of LS flex. when O. sin = 1 −0.007** −0.004 −0.006012
(0.003) 0.003 0.0038568
Wald test (F-statistic): 3.42** 1.49 2.37*
H0: LS flex. total effect = 0
Threshold original sin 0.56 0.63 0.57
H0: Threshold = 0 (F-statistic) 40.86*** 16.20*** 19.89***
H0: Threshold = 1 (F-statistic) 23.39*** 9.01*** 11.43***
Hansen overidentification test
H0 valid instruments 0.064 0.123 0.524 0.892 0.199
(Prob > chi2)
Observations 132 132 88 72 132
Number of countries 76 76 51 40 76
Robust t statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
positive), and this impact is significant. Besides, the total effect of exchange
rate flexibility is significant.
Notice that the linear effect of original sin is significantly positive in column
(2), which is at odds with the findings of Eichengreen et al. (2005) and Levy-
Yeyati (2006), who show that the impact of liability dollarization is either
negative or unconclusive. However, the negative effect of the linear term does
not imply that the overall effect of original sin is positive. When evaluated with
the average value of exchange rate flexibility, the impact of original sin is less
significant.
To illustrate the magnitude of these effects, consider Poland: between the
end of the nineties and the beginning of the 2000s, its index of original sin
moved from 0.92 to 0.62. Considering its LS index (4) during 2000–2004, its
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growth gain is 0.5 percentage point per year, according to column (2). Similarly,
an entirely dollarized emerging country (original sin index equal to 1) with sim-
ilar exchange rate flexibility would gain 1 percentage point of annual growth
if it equalized its level of dollarization to that of Poland. Since most emerging
countries are entirely dollarized, this means that the aggregate growth gains
of allowing for dedollarization are potentially substantial. However, if some
countries have succeeded in bringing down their level of liability dollarization,
like Poland, but also Israel, Chile and Mexico, original sin remains a persistent
phenomenon that often resists policy attempts to dedollarize (Reinhart et al.
2003).
An alternative policy to dedollarization, and perhaps more effective, is to
decrease the level of exchange rate flexibility. Consider for example Slovenia
which, in the process of integration into the Eurozone, stabilized progressively
its exchange rate. Its index of exchange rate flexibility moved from 1.8 to 1
while its dollarization index stayed constant at 1. This corresponds to a 0.6
percentage point increase in growth rate. In general, moving from one level
of flexibility to a lower one in the LS scale (e.g. from a crawling peg to a
peg—from 2 to 1 in the LS scale, or from a float to a dirty float—from 4 to 3)
increases growth by 0.7 percentage points in countries that are fully dollarized.
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) examine the channels of the
impact of exchange rate flexibility on growth. Column (3) introduces REER
volatility and its interaction with original sin. The interaction of original sin
with REER volatility is significantly negative while its interaction with the LS
index of exchange rate flexibility becomes non-significant. This means that, as
implied by the model, real exchange rate volatility is the main channel through
which exchange rate management affects growth.
Column (4) estimates the impact of REER volatility along with terms-
of-trade volatility and their respective interactions with original sin. Neither
terms-of-trade volatility nor its interaction with original sin affect growth,
whereas the coefficient of the interaction of REER volatility with original sin
remains significantly negative. This suggests that the main channel through
which REER volatility affects growth is the volatility of the relative price of
nontradables.
Our results are consistent with Aghion et al. (2009), who show that financial
development makes exchange rate volatility less harmful to growth. Indeed,
dollarization is intimately related to financial development since the lack of
ability to borrow in the domestic currency is a kind of market incompleteness.
Financial dollarization is actually one of the channels through which financial
underdevelopment affects growth. Our results therefore reinforce the findings
of Aghion et al.
However, the observation that dollarization and financial development
are negatively correlated (see Appendix B) makes us wonder whether the
interaction effects we find merely reflect the effect of financial development
already highlighted in Aghion et al. or whether they identify an independent
effect of financial dollarization. In column (5), we test whether original sin is an
independent determinant of the relationship between exchange rate volatility
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and growth. This regression includes the interaction between financial devel-
opment and exchange rate flexibility. The interaction between exchange rate
flexibility and original sin remains significant, which suggests that original sin
conditions the impact of exchange rate flexibility on growth independently
from financial development. The interaction between financial development
and exchange rate flexibility is non-significant. However, given the strong
correlation between original sin and financial development, this does not
necessarily indicate that financial development is irrelevant in shaping the
relationship between exchange rate regimes and growth.
4.3 Robustness Checks
Columns (1)–(5) of Table 2 provide robustness checks. These robustness
checks include adding traditional controls in the growth regression, controlling
for crisis episodes, using an alternative measure of original sin and controlling
for the heterogeneity between industrial and developing countries. The same
method of two-stage system-GMM and Windmeijer (2004) small sample ro-
bust standard errors is used.
4.3.1 Additional Controls
As column (1) of Table 2 shows, the inclusion of additional controls does not
change the results: the interaction term between original sin and exchange
rate flexibility is still significantly negative at the 5% level. Among the new
variables, inflation and education show up as significant. The lack of price
stability has a negative influence on growth while education has a positive
impact, which in line with the traditional findings of the literature and with
common wisdom.
4.3.2 Currency Crisis
Column (2) presents further robustness checks. The question tackled here is
the role of currency crises. Since episodes of crisis-driven devaluations occur
mainly during fixed exchange rate regimes and could be mistakenly classified
as flexible exchange rate regimes, this question is important to assess the
different advantages of fixed exchange rate regimes versus floats.
A dummy for the occurrence of currency crisis episodes and its interaction
with original sin are introduced in the regression to check whether the neg-
ative growth effect of the interaction between original sin and exchange rate
volatility is limited to episodes of financial turmoil. We identify currency crisis
through the “freely falling” episodes provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
The results show that, in spite of the inclusion of a dummy for freely falling
episodes and its interaction with original sin, the interaction of exchange rate
flexibility and original sin is still significant. This shows that the particularly
negative impact of flexible exchange rate regimes in dollarized countries
highlighted before is not driven by financial turmoil episodes.
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Table 2 Growth effects of the flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime—robustness checks—2-step
system-GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) small sample robust correction and time effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excluding
industrial
Initial output per worker −0.015** −0.00713 −0.012* −0.0130 −0.013* −0.015*
(0.007) (0.00699) (0.007) (0.00894) (0.008) (0.008)
Financial development −0.001 −0.00318 −0.002 −0.00183 −0.001 0.004
(0.008) (0.00504) (0.004) (0.00855) (0.004) (0.004)
Original sin 0.028 0.0383** 0.0353
(0.022) (0.0158) (0.0256)
Original sin 2 0.010* 0.009 0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
LS flexibility index 0.005* 0.00676** 0.002 0.00815 −0.000 −0.000
(0.003) (0.00285) (0.002) (0.00665) (0.003) (0.004)
LS flexibility × −0.011** −0.0132*** −0.0141**
original sin (0.005) (0.00429) (0.00693)
LS flexibility × −0.014*** −0.013** −0.019***
original sin 2 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Control variables
Education 0.034*** 0.0261** 0.038*** 0.0344*** 0.038*** 0.037***
(0.010) (0.00988) (0.008) (0.0109) (0.007) (0.010)
Trade openness 0.005 0.00748 0.010** 0.00536 0.008
(0.007) (0.00542) (0.004) (0.00780) (0.005)
Inflation −0.066*** −0.0625** −0.062** −0.0678*** −0.063** −0.047**
(0.022) (0.0293) (0.027) (0.0202) (0.029) (0.022)
Government burden −0.006 −0.00413 −0.010* −0.00628 −0.008
(0.007) (0.00743) (0.005) (0.00737) (0.005)
Freely falling −0.255
(0.189)
Freely falling × 0.252
original sin (0.191)
Industrial country 0.00201 −0.009
(0.0176) (0.009)
Industrial country × −0.00155 0.003
LS flexibility (0.00415) (0.003)
Hansen overidentification test
H0 Valid instruments 0.597 0.992 0.606 0.552 0.566 0.525
(Prob > chi2)
Observations 129 125 129 129 129 92
Number of countries 75 71 75 75 75 54
Robust t statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
4.3.3 Dollarized Indebtment
The original sin measure used in the baseline regressions is a composite index
summarizing the inability of a country to hedge currency risk. But it does not
take into account the extent to which it is exposed to this currency risk, that
is debt liabilities. The amount of indebtment should qualify the importance
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of original sin. We therefore construct another variable incorporating both
original sin and debt liabilities, and defined as: OSIN2 = OSIN ∗ DEBT L,
where DEBT L refers to external debt liabilities over GDP (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2006). Column (3) provides the regression with this alternative original
sin measure. The results are reinforced: the coefficient is now significant at the
1% level.
4.3.4 Developing Versus Industrial Countries
Columns (4)–(6) try to determine whether our results are due to the fact that
original sin is very high in developing countries and low in industrial economies
in general. The results could reflect only the fact that exchange rate flexibility
is bad for growth in emerging economies as other authors have already shown,
without proving necessarily the role of dollarization. This objection is justified
by the observation that original sin is very correlated with the fact of being a
developing or industrial country (see Fig. 3 and the correlation between initial
productivity and original sin in Appendix B).
A dummy for industrial countries and its interaction with exchange rate
flexibility are thus added in columns (4) and (5), with our alternative measures
of original sin. Consider column (4), which uses OSIN as a measure of dollar-
ization. The results are robust: the coefficient is stable and remains significant
at the 5% level. However, original sin being very stable in the sample of
developing countries, the effect of the interaction term is identified mainly
through the variation between industrial countries. To overcome this problem,
the second measure of original sin (OSIN2), incorporating debt liabilities and
which thus provides more variability among developing countries, is used in
column (5). The interaction term remains stable and significant.
Finally, column (6) excludes industrial countries from the sample. The
sample size being significantly reduced, the less significant control variables
(namely trade openness and government burden) are excluded. Since OSIN
shows little variability in developing countries, OSIN2 is used as a measure
of dollarization in this regression. Here again, the interaction term is robustly
negative.
4.4 Endogeneity Issues
One important reproach that can be addressed to our results is the question of
endogeneity. Two different strategies are adopted to deal with this problem:
(1) exogeneity tests are conducted within the GMM methodology, and (2) the
endogeneity issue is dealt with by examining the existing empirical evidence on
the determinants of original sin and exchange rate flexibility. This last discus-
sion enables us to (i) address the simultaneity issue by introducing additional
variables that could be correlated with both growth and dollarization; and (ii)
to propose an external instrumental variable for original sin.
First, note that the system-GMM methodology deals with the endogeneity
of the lagged explanatory variable. Still, the procedure is valid only under our
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assumption that the other regressors are predetermined, which means that
the regressors are uncorrelated with the current and future realizations of the
error term, and uncorrelated with fixed effects. This condition can be tested
by a Sargan test of overidentification which assesses the overall validity of the
instruments. All the Sargan tests of the tables accept the validity of the set of
instruments. Besides, as highlighted by Aghion et al. (2009), the interaction
term is less vulnerable to potential endogeneity issues than the corresponding
linear terms, because it identifies contrasting growth effects. Indeed, the use
of interactions is similar to the difference-in-difference method. Even though
the linear effect of original sin of exchange rate flexibility might be biased, the
effect of exchange rate flexibility, given the level of original sin, can still be
accurate.
Second, the literature has looked for the causes of original sin: Hausmann
and Panizza (2003) find weak support for the idea that the level of develop-
ment, institutional quality, monetary credibility or fiscal solvency is correlated
with original sin. Only the absolute size of the economy is robustly correlated.
Other studies analysed the determinants of other variables that could be partly
related to original sin. Mehl and Reynaud (2005) show that inflation—which
is already included in the present growth regressions—debt service to GDP,
the slope of the yield curve and the investor base influence domestic original
sin. Levy-Yeyati (2006) finds that institutional variables and inflation, but also
pass-through and the procyclicality of the real exchange rate, have an impact
on domestic dollarization. To study the impact of dollarization on growth, he
uses restrictions on onshore foreign currency deposits (De Nicolo et al. 2003)
as an instrument. The degree of pass-through and the correlation of the real
exchange rate with growth are not sufficiently correlated with our index to be
used as instruments in our study. However, restrictions on foreign currency
deposits appears as a good instrument for external original sin, so we use them
as an external instrument inside the GMM methodology. Concerning debt and
institutions, since they could also have an impact on growth, I include them in
the regressions to check for robustness.
As for exchange rate flexibility, some determinants have been highlighted
in the literature. Hau (2002) show that trade openness is an important factor in
explaining real exchange rate volatility. This variable is already included in our
regressions in the robustness checks. Hausmann et al. (2006) find that growth
has a significantly positive effect on real exchange rate volatility. This should
bias the effect of exchange rate volatility upwards. Therefore, if the coefficient
is negative despite this positive bias, our interpretations remain correct.13
Consider Table 3. Column (1) deals with the simultaneity issue by introduc-
ing the average of Kaufmann et al. (1999) Governance indicators, which should
account for institutional quality and net external debt as a share of GDP (Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti 2006). The inflation rate is also maintained, since it has also
13For further discussion of the endogeneity issues associated with exchange rate flexibility, see
Aghion et al. (2009).
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Table 3 Growth effects of
the flexibility of Exchange
Rate Regime—endogeneity
treatment—2-step
system-GMM estimation with
Windmeijer (2004) small
sample robust correction and
time effects
Robust t statistics in
parentheses
*significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%
aRestrictions on onshore
foreign currency deposits
(De Nicolo et al. 2003) used
as external instrument
(1) (2)a
Initial output per worker −0.0221*** −0.00619
(0.00734) (0.00797)
Financial development −0.00295 −0.000736
(0.00586) (0.00655)
Original sin 0.00434 0.0106
(0.00364) (0.00758)
LS flexibility index 0.0413** 0.0661**
(0.0203) (0.0285)
LS flexibility × original sin −0.0100* −0.0181**
(0.00531) (0.00827)
Control variables
Education 0.0272*** 0.0281*
(0.00865) (0.0154)
Trade openness −0.000225 0.00667
(0.00519) (0.00631)
Inflation −0.0536** −0.0571***
(0.0265) (0.0193)
Government burden −0.00626 −0.000733
(0.00706) (0.00809)
Institutional quality 0.00262**
(0.00126)
Net external debt −0.01000**
(0.00495)
Hansen overidentification test
H0 valid instruments 0.849 0.998
(Prob > chi2)
Observations 129 91
Number of countries 75 51
been pointed to as a cause for liability dollarization. The interaction between
original sin and exchange rate flexibility is still negative and the main results
are unchanged. The interaction term loses accuracy, but remains statistically
significant at the 10% level. The signs of the additional variables are sensible:
institutional quality favors growth while net debt is damaging.
Column (2) uses restrictions on foreign currency deposits from De Nicolo
et al. (2003) and its interaction with exchange rate flexibility to instrument
original sin and its interaction. The negative effect of the interaction still
appears as robust.14
As a conclusion, the nonlinear effect of exchange rate flexibility and original
sin on growth is globally robust to the inclusion of additional controls and
to the use of an alternative measure of original sin: exchange rate flexibility
has a more negative impact on productivity growth in dollarized than in non-
dollarized countries. Besides, this additional negative effect is not due to
exchange rate crisis episodes. Additionally, the high concentration of original
sin in developing country is not driving our results. Finally, the results are
14Interestingly, when adding additional variables and controlling for endogeneity, the linear term
becomes unsignificant, which does not contradict previous evidence in the literature.
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robust to endogeneity treatments. Therefore, further controls do not change
the results qualitatively. However, they do affect quantitatively the interaction
term of exchange rate flexibility. In particular, the effects are typically lower
than in the baseline regression in column (2) of Table 1. But since the linear
effect of exchange rate flexibility is also typically lower, the level of original sin
at which the effect of flexible rates change signs remains significantly between
0 and 1, at levels between 0.40 and 0.60, depending on the specification.
5 Conclusion
This paper discusses the conventional view that there is no significant
difference in the growth performances of fixed and flexible exchange rate
regimes. This view has been misleadingly characterized by the empirical
literature because usually the specificity of emerging markets financial systems
is not taken into account. Whereas Aghion et al. (2009) highlight the role
of financial development, this paper focuses on original sin, which is another
prominent feature of the developing world. A theoretical model is developed,
in which the higher the share of foreign currency in external debt, the more
exchange rate volatility is detrimental to growth, which is in line with the
empirical results of Section 4: the interaction of exchange rate flexibility with
original sin has a negative impact. It appears also that, in absolute terms,
exchange rate flexibility is growth-reducing in highly dollarized countries and
growth-enhancing in low dollarization countries. Consistently, the threshold
original sin above which exchange rate risk becomes detrimental to growth is
estimated to be significantly between zero and one. This sheds some light on
the instability of the effect of exchange rate volatility on growth in previous
literature. We also show that these predictions survive robustness checks and
endogeneity treatment.
The study of the impact of exchange rate flexibility on growth can help
address the issue of the choice of monetary framework in a setting of financial
openness and growing cross-country capital flows. The available choices are
delimited by the “trilemma” (Obstfeld et al. 2005): under perfect capital mo-
bility, policymakers cannot attain simultaneously exchange rate stability and
domestically-oriented monetary policy. Typically, as in this paper’s theoretical
framework, adopting an exchange rate peg entails the sacrifice of the shock
absorption capacity of flexible exchange rates. Forex market interventions can
maintain an exchange rate fixed while pursuing domestic policy objectives,
but international reserves are sooner or later depleted, making it impossible
to achieve both objectives in the long run. It might seem then optimal for
emerging countries that embrace financial globalization to let the exchange
rate float in order to follow domestic objectives, but liability dollarization
makes it more difficult for them to adopt floating exchange rates. This explains
why they exhibit “fear of floating” (Hausmann et al. 2001; Calvo and Reinhart
2002). This study sheds some additional light on the reasons why developing
economies find it hard to draw a comfortable resolution of the trilemma.
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Finally, a caveat of our approach is that we treated exchange rate regimes as
a continuum, from rigid to flexible. As has been emphasized in the literature,
some other dimensions of exchange rate regimes may matter, for example, the
distinction between hard and soft fixes (Bubula and Otker-Robe 2003), and
the presence of a monetary anchor for (Bailliu et al. 2003). In particular, the
specificity of intermediary regimes dollarization suggests an interesting direc-
tion for research. Because these regimes are more prone to currency crises than
both floats and hard pegs, liability dollarization should be particularly harmful
for them. This could explain the “vanishing middle” hypothesis (Fischer 2001).
But this is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
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Appendix A: Countries in Sample
Asia
China
Hong Kong, China
India
Indonesia
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Transition countries
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Estonia
Hungary (only 00–04)
Kazakhstan (only 00–04)
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova (only 95–99)
Poland
Romania (only 00–04)
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Turkey
Ukraine 95–99
Latin America
Argentina
Bolivia (only 95–99)
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama (only 95–99)
Papua New Guinea (only 95–99)
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago 00–04
Uruguay
Venezuela, RB (only 95–99)
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria (only 95–99)
Bahrain (only 95–99)
Egypt, Arab Rep. (only 00–04)
Israel
Oman (only 95–99)
Tunisia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Kenya (only 95–99)
Mauritius
South Africa
Zimbabwe (only 95–99)
Industrial countries
Australia
Austria (only 00–04)
Belgium (only 00–04)
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France (only 00–04)
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands (only 00–04)
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics 1995–2004 (data in five-year averages)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Productivity growth 134 0.02 0.02 −0.05 0.10
Initial productivity 134 26,413.24 18,668.75 2,172.53 70,091.68
Financial development 134 0.53 0.39 0.03 1.63
Education 134 83.79 28.43 14.00 158.76
Trade openness 134 81.38 46.03 18.11 322.35
Inflation 134 0.08 0.11 −0.02 0.78
Government burden 134 15.87 5.17 5.52 29.21
Kaufman governance index 134 3.19 4.83 −7.06 11.69
Net external debt 134 0.24 0.42 −2.15 1.88
REER vol. 90 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.19
LS index of ER flex. 129 2.40 1.18 1.00 4.00
Original sin 134 0.86 0.22 0.20 1.00
Sample correlations 1995–2004 (data in five-year averages)
Prod. Initial Fin. Education Trade Inflation
growth prod. dev. open.
Prod. growth −
Initial prod. 0.13 −
Fin. dev. 0.19 0.61 −
Education 0.22 0.74 0.51 −
Trade open. 0.11 −0.05 0.00 0.01 −
Inflation −0.44 −0.44 −0.48 −0.34 −0.01 −
Gov. burden −0.09 0.50 0.20 0.62 0.06 −0.20
Gov. index 0.29 0.84 0.63 0.80 0.02 −0.48
Net ext. debt −0.24 −0.39 −0.36 −0.22 −0.24 0.18
REER vol. −0.51 −0.37 −0.31 −0.25 −0.07 0.59
LS index of ER flex. −0.22 −0.18 −0.21 −0.06 −0.30 0.10
O. sin −0.02 −0.68 −0.65 −0.50 0.24 0.35
Sample correlations 1995–2004 (data in five-year averages)
Gov. Gov. Net REER LS index
burden index external vol. of ER
debt flex.
Prod. growth
Initial prod.
Fin. dev.
Education
Trade open.
Inflation
Gov. burden −
Gov. index 0.44 −
Net ext. debt 0.01 −0.31 −
REER vol. −0.16 −0.42 0.11 −
LS index of ER flex. −0.07 −0.16 0.09 0.26 −
O. sin −0.23 −0.59 0.31 0.17 0.00
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